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Abstract
We consider hedonic games with separable preferences, and explore
the existence of stable coalition structures if only individual deviations
are allowed. For two natural subdomains of separable preferences,
namely preference domains based on (1) aversion to enemies and (2)
appreciation of friends, we show that an individually stable coalition
structure always exist, and a Nash stable coalition structure exists
when mutuality is imposed. Moreover, we show that on the domain of
separable preferences a contractual individually stable coalition struc-
ture can be obtained in polynomial time. Finally, we prove that, on
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1each of the two subdomains, the corresponding algorithm that we use
for ﬁnding Nash stable and individually stable coalition structures
turns out to be strategy-proof.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The formal model of a hedonic coalition formation game as introduced by
Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002)
consists of two components, namely a ﬁnite set of players and a preference
ranking for each player deﬁned over the coalitions that player may belong to.
The outcome of such a game is a partition of the society (the set of players)
into coalitions, where a partition of the society into coalitions is called a
coalition structure. This model explicitly takes into account the dependence
of an agent’s utility on the identity of the members of his or her coalition as
recognized in the seminal paper of Drèze and Greenberg (1980).
In this paper we consider hedonic games with separable preferences,a n d
study the existence of stable coalition structures if only individual deviations
are allowed. A player’s preference is separable if he or she views every other
player either as a friend or as an enemy, and the division between friends
and enemies guides the ordering of coalitions in the sense that adding a
friend leads to a more preferable coalition, while adding an enemy leads to
a less preferable coalition. More speciﬁcally, we concentrate on two natural
subdomains of separable preferences, namely preference domains based on
aversion to enemies and appreciation of friends.
The preference domain based on aversion to enemies corresponds to a
2situation in which, when comparing two coalitions, every player looks ﬁrst at
his or her enemies in either coalition. The coalition that contains less enemies
is declared by the player as better than the other, and if the two coalitions
have the same number of enemies, then the number of friends is decisive for
the comparison. This kind of preference restriction can be illustrated by the
f o r m a t i o no fs w i m m i n gt e a m s ,w h e r eab a dg u yc a na ﬀect the whole outcome
of the coalition.
The preference domain based on appreciation of friends corresponds to a
situation in which, when comparing two coalitions, every player pays atten-
tion ﬁrst to his or her friends in either coalition. The coalition that contains
more friends is declared by the player as better than the other, and if the
two coalitions have the same number of friends, then the coalition with less
enemies wins the comparison. This kind of preference restriction is appropri-
ate in contexts where friendship collaboration is crucial for the payoﬀ that
a player obtains from a coalition, while the harm produced by the remain-
ing players in the coalition is small for the player. An example may be the
formation of research groups that compete for grants.
Notice that these two subdomains allow for indiﬀerences in the corre-
sponding rankings over coalitions. For the two classes of hedonic games cor-
responding to these two subdomains, Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx, and Sung
(2004) study the existence of core stable coalition structures, and provide
algorithms for generating such coalition structures. However, there are cases
in which coalitional deviations are not possible and, hence, solution concepts
that consider only individual deviations are warranted. We concentrate in
this paper on Nash stability and individual stability. A coalition structure is
Nash stable if no player wishes to migrate to another coalition in the same
coalition structure. Individual stability, in addition, pays attention to the
3reaction of the welcoming coalition in the sense that no one in that coalition
should be made worse oﬀ.
It turns out that individually stable coalition structures for the two classes
of hedonic games always exist. The way we restrict players’ preferences allow
us also to present a positive result on the existence of Nash stable coalition
structures when, in addition, mutuality on the preferences is imposed (i.e.
the friendship among players is always mutual). It should be noted that, in
contrast to Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002), symmetry (requiring that the
players have the same reciprocal values for each other and being stronger than
mutuality) is no longer crucial for the existence proofs. For an excellent study
of the role of symmetric additive separable preferences in hedonic games the
reader is referred to Burani and Zwicker (2003).
When looking for individually stable or Nash stable coalition structures,
we make use of the two algorithms proposed by Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx,
and Sung (2004) for generating core stable coalition structures, and show that
these core stable coalition structures are also individually stable or Nash sta-
ble. Moreover, on the separable preference domain a contractual individually
stable coalition structure can be obtain in polynomial time by using one of
the proposed algorithms.
The algorithms suggested by Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx, and Sung (2004)
can be considered also as functions which assign a coalition structure to each
hedonic game in the proposed domains. We show that these algorithms are
strategy-proof on the corresponding domains, in the sense that no player can
proﬁtably misrepresent his or her preference to obtain a better outcome.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the for-
mal model of a hedonic game and diﬀerent stability notions for this class
of games already known in the literature; it introduces also the classes of
4preferences based on aversion to enemies and appreciation of friends, respec-
tively. The algorithms used by Dimitrov, Borm, Hendrickx, and Sung (2004)
for generating core stable coalition structures for these two classes of hedonic
games are described and exempliﬁed in Section 3. Section 4 presents our
results on the existence of stable coalition structures on the corresponding
domains when only individual deviations are allowed. Section 5 is devoted
to the study of strategy-proofness of the proposed algorithms. We conclude
in Section 6 with some ﬁnal remarks.
2B a s i c n o t i o n s
Consider a ﬁnite set of players N = {1,2,...,n}.Acoalition is a non-empty
subset of N.F o re a c hp l a y e ri ∈ N,w ed e n o t eb yNi = {X ⊆ N | i ∈ X}
the collection of all coalitions containing i. A collection C of coalitions is
called a coalition structure if C is a partition of N, i.e. the coalitions in C are
pairwise disjoint and
S
X∈C X = N. The set of all coalition structures on N
is denoted by CN. For each coalition structure C a n de a c hp l a y e ri ∈ N,b y
C(i) we denote the coalition in C containing i, i.e. {C(i)} = C ∩ Ni.
We assume that each player i ∈ N is endowed with a preference ºi over
Ni, i.e. a binary relation over Ni which is reﬂexive, complete, and transitive.
We denote by Pi the set of all player i’s preferences, by P =( º1,º2,...,ºn)
ap r o ﬁle of preferences ºi for all i ∈ N,a n db yP = P1 × ...×P n the set
of all preference proﬁles. Moreover, we assume that the preference of each
player i ∈ N over coalition structures is purely hedonic, i.e. it is completely
characterized by ºi in such a way that, for each C and C0,e a c hp l a y e ri
weakly prefers C to C0 if and only if C(i) ºi C0(i).
A hedonic game on a ﬁnite set N of players with a preference proﬁle
5P ∈ P is denoted by the pair (N,P). The set of all hedonic games will be
denoted by G.
Let C be a coalition structure. We say that
•Cis weak core stable if there does not exist a nonempty coalition X
such that X Âi C(i) for all i ∈ X;
•Cis strong core stable if there does not exist a nonempty coalition X
such that X ºi C(i) for all i ∈ X,a n dX Âj C(j) for at least one
j ∈ X;
•Cis Nash stable if there do not exist i ∈ N and a coalition X ∈ C∪{∅}
such that X ∪ {i}Â i C(i);
•Cis individually stable if there do not exist i ∈ N and a coalition
X ∈ C∪{∅} such that X∪{i}Â i C(i),a n dX∪{i}º j X for all j ∈ X;
•Cis contractual individually stable if there do not exist i ∈ N and a
coalition X ∈ C ∪ {∅} such that X ∪ {i}Â i C(i), X ∪ {i}º j X for all
j ∈ X,a n dC(i) \{ i}º j C(i) for all j ∈ C(i) \{ i}.
Clearly, Nash stability implies individual stability that, in turn, implies
contractual individual stability. Moreover, individual stability is implied by
strong core stability as well.
We now specify the preference domains that will be considered. For each
i ∈ N,w el e tGi = G(ºi)={j ∈ N : {i,j}º i {i}} be the set of friends
of player i, and its complement Bi = N \ Gi the set of enemies of player i.
Notice that, from {i}º i {i},w eh a v ei ∈ Gi for each i ∈ N.T h e n e x t
deﬁnition suggests two natural ways of how each player i ranks the sets in
Ni depending on the numbers of his or her friends and enemies.
6Deﬁnition 1 Let P =( º1,º2,...,ºn) ∈ P be a preference proﬁle.
• We say that P is based on aversion to enemies if, for all i ∈ N and
all X,Y ∈ Ni, X ºi Y if and only if (1) |X ∩ Bi| < |Y ∩ Bi| or (2)
|X ∩ Bi| = |Y ∩ Bi| and |X ∩ Gi| ≥ |Y ∩ Gi|.
• We say that P is based on appreciation of friends if, for all i ∈ N
and all X,Y ∈ Ni, X ºi Y if and only if (1) |X ∩ Gi| > |Y ∩ Gi| or
(2) |X ∩ Gi| = |Y ∩ Gi| and |X ∩ Bi| ≤ |Y ∩ Bi|.
Observe that if the preference proﬁle is based on aversion to enemies,
each player looks ﬁrst at his or her enemies in the corresponding coalitions;
i ft h ep r e f e r e n c ep r o ﬁle is based on appreciation of friends, we have a priority
for friends when comparing two coalitions. In the following, the set of all
preference proﬁles based on aversion to enemies is denoted by Pe,a n dt h e
set of all preference proﬁles based on appreciation of friends is denoted by
Pf. The corresponding sets of hedonic games will be denoted by Ge and Gf,
respectively.
It is not diﬃcult to see that if players’ preferences are induced by either
way suggested by Deﬁnition 1, then each player i will be equipped with
a preference relation over Ni with Gi being its top and Bi ∪ {i} being its
bottom. In fact, the preference proﬁles based on aversion to enemies and the
preference proﬁles based on appreciation of friends belong to a more general
class of preference proﬁles, namely the class of additive separable preferences.
A preference proﬁle P ∈ P is additive separable if, for all i ∈ N,t h e r e





j∈Y vi(j). We denote the set of all additive separable
preference proﬁles by Pas, and the corresponding set of hedonic games by
Gas. For example, when P ∈ Pe,o n ec a nt a k e ,f o re a c hi ∈ N, vi(j)=1
7if j ∈ Gi,a n dvi(j)=−n otherwise; when P ∈ Pf, one can take, for each
i ∈ N, vi(j)=n if j ∈ Gi,a n dvi(j)=−1 otherwise. Therefore, we have
(Pe ∪ Pf) ⊂ Pas and (Ge ∪ Gf) ⊂ Gas. All additive separable preference
proﬁles are also separable.
Deﬁnition 2 A preference proﬁle P ∈ P is separable if, for every player
i ∈ N, there is a partition (Gi,B i) of N such that for every j ∈ N and
X ∈ Ni with j/ ∈ X,w eh a v e[X ∪ {j}º i X ⇔ j ∈ Gi] and [X ∪ {j}¹ i
X ⇔ j ∈ Bi].
Since (Gi,B i) is partition of N, each separable preference proﬁle P is such
that, for every i,j ∈ N and X ∈ Ni with j/ ∈ X,w eh a v ee i t h e rX∪{j}º i X
or X∪{j}¹ i X but not both. Hence, an equivalent deﬁnition of separability
can be obtained by replacing ºi and ¹i respectively by Âi and ≺i.W ed e n o t e
the set of all separable preference proﬁles by Ps and the corresponding set of
games on player set N by Gs.C l e a r l y ,w eh a v e(Pe ∪ Pf) ⊂ Pas ⊂ Ps ⊂ P
and (Ge ∪ Gf) ⊂ Gas ⊂ Gs ⊂ G.
3T w o a l g o r i t h m s
Let H =( V,E) be a directed graph with set of vertices V and set of directed
edges E ⊆ V × V .A p a t h (k1,k 2,...,k m) in H is a sequence of vertices
k1,k 2,...,k m ∈ V for some positive integer m such that (kl,k l+1) ∈ E for
each 1 ≤ l ≤ m−1, and we say that (k1,k 2,...,k m) is a path from k1 to km.
Let X ⊆ V .W es a yt h a tX is strongly connected if, for every i,j ∈ X,t h e r e
is a path from i to j which only contains vertices belonging to X.W es a yt h a t
X is a strongly connected component if X is strongly connected and, for all
Y ⊆ N which properly contains X, Y is not strongly connected. Moreover,
we say that X is a clique in H if (i,j) ∈ E for every i,j ∈ X.
8For each (N,P) ∈ Gs and each nonempty Y ⊆ N,l e tH(Y,P) =( V,E) be
a directed graph with V = Y and E = {(i,j) ∈ Y × Y | i 6= j, j ∈ Gi}.I n
the following, two ways of partitioning the player set N in terms of H(Y,P)s
are described.
Algorithm 1
• Set Y := N and C := ∅.
• Repeat the following until Y = ∅:
- Find a clique X ⊆ Y in H(Y,P) with the largest number of vertices.
-S e tY := Y \ X and C := C ∪ {X}.
• Return C.
Algorithm 1 partitions the set N into coalitions in such a way that it ﬁrst
subtracts the largest clique X in H(N,P) from N, then it subtracts the largest
clique X0 in H(Y,P) from Y = N \ X,a n ds oo n ,u n t i ln ov e r t e xr e m a i n s .
Algorithm 2
• Set Y := N and C := ∅.
• Repeat the following until Y = ∅:
- Find a strongly connected component X ⊆ Y in H(Y,P).
-S e tY := Y \ X and C := C ∪ {X}.
• Return C.
Algorithm 2 partitions the set N into coalitions each of which is a strongly
connected component in H(N,P). That is, Algorithm 2 ﬁnds the strong de-
composition of graph H(N,P),a n di tc a nb ed o n ei nO(|N|2) time (see Tarjan
9(1972)). Note that it is always possible to generate coalition structures by
Algorithm 2 provided that players’ preferences are separable. However, it is
not guaranteed that all coalition structures generated by this algorithm will
be for example core stable for a corresponding hedonic game with separable
preferences: as exempliﬁed by Banerjee, Konishi, and Sönmez (2001) the core
of a hedonic game may be empty even when players’ preferences are additive
separable and symmetric.
Suppose now that we disallow for mutuality (and, hence, for symmetry)
but restrict players’ additive separable preferences to be based on aversion
to enemies or on appreciation of friends. It turns out that in this case the
above algorithms generate core stable coalition structures as follows.
Theorem 1 Let (N,P) ∈ Ge and let C be a coalition structure generated by
Algorithm 1.T h e nC i saw e a kc o r es t a b l ec o a l i t i o ns t r u c t u r ef o r(N,P).
Theorem 2 Let (N,P) ∈ Gf and let C be a coalition structure generated by
Algorithm 2.T h e nC is a strong core stable coalition structure for (N,P).
For proofs of these statements the reader is referred to Dimitrov, Borm,
Hendrickx, and Sung (2004).
Note that the largest clique in H(N,P) m a yn o tb eu n i q u e ,a n di ns u c ha
case, it is not clear from the description of Algorithm 1 which clique will be
selected. In other words, a diﬀerent selection of cliques may lead to a diﬀerent
outcome. A more precise description of Algorithm 1 will be given in Section 5
in order to obtain a unique outcome for each game (N,P) ∈ Gs. In contrast,
the outcome of Algorithm 2 is unique, because the strong decomposition of
each directed graph is unique. This point is illustrated by the next example
in which every player is indiﬀerent among coalitions on the same row and, for
each i ∈ N, the top row corresponds to Gi and the bottom row corresponds
10to Bi ∪ {i}.
Example 1 Let N = {1,2,3,4} and G1 = {1,2,3,4}, G2 = {2,3,4}, G3 =
{1,3},a n dG4 = {1,3,4}. Then we have the following preferences of the
players over the coalitions they may belong to.
Aversion to Enemies:
123 4
134 234 1234 14
13,14 23,24 123,134,234 4




134 234 1234 14
1234 1234 123,134,234 124,134
13,14 23,24 13,23,34 1234
123,124 123,124 3 4
12 ...
... ...
Algorithm 1 s e l e c t sa sw e a kc o r es t a b l ec o a l i t i o ns t r u c t u r ef o rt h ec a s eo fa v e r -
sion to enemies either C = {{1,3},{2},{4}} or C0 = {{1,4},{2,3}}.N o t e
that player 2 for example is not indiﬀerent between C and C0 (i.e. between
C (2) and C0 (2)). Algorithm 2 selects {1,2,3,4} as a strong core coalition
structure for the case of appreciation of friends. In this case the coalition
structures {{1,3,4},{2}} and {{1,4},{2,3}} are strong core stable as well.
114 Individual deviations and stability
Having described the algorithms for generating core stable coalition struc-
tures for hedonic games with preference proﬁles belonging to Pe and Pf,
we redirect now our attention to the Nash stability, individual stability, and
contractual individual stability for such games.
4.1 Nash stability
Although appreciation of friends and aversion of enemies are very strong
restrictions, it turns out that they do not guarantee the existence of Nash
stable coalition structures. The next example shows a hedonic game (N,P) ∈
Ge ∩ Gf for which there is no Nash stable coalition structure.
Example 2 Let N = {1,2,3} and G1 = {1}, G2 = {2},a n dG3 = {1,2,3}.
Then we have the the following preferences of the players over the coalitions





Note that each of the players 1 and 2 would prefer to stay alone, i.e. we
have to check only the coalition structure C = {{1},{2},{3}}. However,
{1,3}Â 3 {3} (and {2,3}Â 3 {3}). Hence, a Nash stable coalition structure
does not exist.
Remark 1 For the game in Example 2 a (strong) core stable coalition struc-
ture still exists ({{1},{2},{3}}), and it is selected by both Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2.
12As shown next, adding mutuality (for all i,j ∈ N, i ∈ Gj if and only if
j ∈ Gi) to enemy aversion always guarantees the existence of a Nash stable
coalition structure.
Proposition 1 Let (N,P) ∈ Ge satisfy mutuality. Then a Nash stable coali-
tion structure exists.
Proof. Let C be a coalition structure generated by Algorithm 1. By Theo-
rem 1, C is weak core stable. We show that C is Nash stable as well. Suppose
not. Then there is i ∈ N and X ∈ C ∪ {∅} such that X ∪ {i}Â i C(i).W e
distinguish the following two cases:
(1) X = ∅.I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v e{i}Â i C(i) that contradicts the fact that
C is weak core stable.
(2) ∅ 6= X ∈ C.S i n c e C(i) is a clique in H(N,P),w eh a v eC(i) ⊆ Gi.I t
follows from X ∪ {i}Â i C(i) and C(i) ⊆ Gi that X ∪ {i} ⊆ Gi, i.e., j ∈ Gi
for all j ∈ X. Then, by mutuality, we have i ∈ Gj for all j ∈ X, and thus,
X ∪ {i}Â j C(j)=X for all j ∈ X. Therefore, X ∪ {i}Â j C(j) for all
j ∈ X ∪ {i}, which contradicts again the weak core stability of C.
Proposition 2 Let (N,P) ∈ Gf satisfy mutuality. Then a Nash stable coali-
tion structure exists.
Proof. Let C be a coalition structure generated by Algorithm 2. By Theo-
rem 2, C is strong core stable. We show that C is Nash stable as well.
Let H(N,P) be the directed graph that corresponds to (N,P),a n dl e t
i ∈ N. Notice that each coalition in C is a strongly connected component of
H(N,P).W h e nC(i) 6= {i}, there exists j ∈ C(i)\{i} such that j ∈ Gi.H e n c e
C(i) ºi {i} = ∅∪{i}. Moreover, it follows by mutuality that there are no
edges between players belonging to diﬀerent strongly connected subgraphs,
i.e., X ⊆ Bi for each X ∈ C\{ C (i)}. Hence, we have C(i) ºi {i}Â i X ∪ {i}
13for each X ∈ C\{ C (i)}. Finally, it is obvious that C(i) ∪ {i}º i C(i).
Therefore, each i ∈ N satisﬁes C(i) ºi X ∪ {i} for all X ∈ C ∪ {∅}, i.e. C is
Nash stable.
Remark 2 Note that mutuality is a crucial condition for proving the existence
of a Nash stable coalition structure in Propositions 1 and 2 but symmetry is
not. A proof for the existence of Nash stable coalition structures when player
preferences are additive separable and symmetric is provided by Bogomolnaia
and Jackson (2002).
4.2 Individual stability
As exempliﬁed above, restricting players’ preferences in a hedonic game to
be based either on aversion to enemies or on appreciation of friends does not
guarantee the existence of a Nash stable coalition structure. However, these
restrictions are suﬃcient for individual stability as shown next.
Proposition 3 Let (N,P) ∈ Ge.T h e na ni n d i v i d u a l l ys t a b l ec o a l i t i o ns t r u c -
ture exists.
Proof. Let C be a coalition structure generated by Algorithm 1. By Theo-
rem 1, C is weak core stable. We show that C is individually stable as well.
Suppose not. Then there is i ∈ N and X ∈ C∪{∅} such that X ∪{i}Â i C(i)
and X ∪ {i}º j X for all j ∈ X. We distinguish the following two cases:
(1) X = ∅.I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v e{i}Â i C(i) that contradicts the fact that
C is weak core stable.
(2) ∅ 6= X ∈ C.F r o mX ∪ {i}º j X for all j ∈ X,w eh a v ei ∈ Gj for all
j ∈ X. Thus, in fact we have X ∪ {i}Â j X for all j ∈ X. Combining with
X ∪ {i}Â i C(i), we can conclude that X ∪ {i} is a strong deviation from C,
which contradicts again the weak core stability of C.
14Proposition 4 Let (N,P) ∈ Gf.T h e na ni n d i v i d u a l l ys t a b l ec o a l i t i o ns t r u c -
ture exists.
Proof. Let C be a coalition structure generated by Algorithm 2. By Theorem
2, C is strong core stable. Because strong core stability implies individual
stability we are done.
4.3 Contractual individual stability
Since individual stability implies contractual individual stability, it follows
that the coalition structures generated by Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 are
also contractual individually stable on the domains based on aversion to
enemies and appreciation of friends, respectively. We ask now the question
whether these algorithms always generate a contractual individually stable
coalition structure on a larger preference domain.
Indeed, as suggested by Ballester (2004), a contractual individually stable
coalition structure on any preference domain can be obtained by an algorithm
which starts with an arbitrary coalition structure C (say, a coalition structure
consisting of singletons only), and repeats the following operation until the
resulting coalition structure becomes contractual individually stable: If some
player i wishes to migrate to another coalition X 6= C(i) in C and no one in
X and C(i) is worse oﬀ (i.e., C is not contractual individually stable), then
remove i from C(i) and put i in X. Observe that, by applying this operation,
no one is worse oﬀ and at least one player is strictly better oﬀ.H e n c e ,t h e
algorithm halts after a ﬁnite number of applications of the operation. As a
straightforward estimation, the running time of this algorithm is exponential
of |N|.
In the following, we show that, when the domain of separable preferences
15is under consideration, a contractual individually stable coalition structure
can be obtained by Algorithm 2, whose running time is O(|N|2),ap o l y n o m i a l
of |N|. Observe that Algorithm 2 only requires a partial description of each
separable preference ºi,n a m e l yt h es e tGi for each i ∈ N, while a complete
description of a preference may have length exponential of |N| even if players’
preferences are separable.
Proposition 5 Let (N,P) ∈ Gs. Then a contractual individually stable
coalition structure can be obtained by Algorithm 2.
Proof. Let (N,P) ∈ Gs. Recall that, for every i,j ∈ N and X ∈ Ni with
j/ ∈ X,w eh a v e[X∪{j}Â i X ⇔ j ∈ Gi] and [X∪{j} ≺i X ⇔ j ∈ Bi].L e tC
be the coalition structure constructed by Algorithm 2, i.e. C is the strong
decomposition of the directed graph H(N,P). In the following, we show that
C is contractual individually stable. Let i ∈ N, and consider the following
two cases:
(1) C(i)={i}.S i n c e e a c h X ∈ C is a strongly connected component
in H(N,P), for all X ∈ C\{ C (i)}, i 6∈ Gj for all j ∈ X if j ∈ Gi for some
j ∈ X.T h u s ,f o ra l lX ∈ C with X 6= C(i),w eh a v eC(i)={i}Â i X ∪{i} or
X Âj X ∪ {i} for all j ∈ X.
(2) C(i) 6= {i}. Again, since each X ∈ C is a strongly connected com-
ponent in H(N,P),t h e r ee x i s t sj ∈ C(i) \{ i} such that i ∈ Gj.T h u s ,
C(i) Âj C(i) \{ i} for some j ∈ C(i) \{ i}.
Therefore, we can conclude that C is contractual individually stable.
Example 3 In order to show that there are cases in which Algorithm 1 does
not deliver a contractual individually stable coalition structure on the class of
separable games, let us consider the following game: Let N = {1,2,3} and







Suppose now that Algorithm 1 selects {{1},{2,3}}. Notice that this coalition
structure is not contractual individually stable because all players are better
oﬀ in the coalition structure {1,2,3}.
5S t r a t e g y - p r o o f n e s s
In this section, we study the question whether the algorithms presented in
Section 3 prevent players from strategic behavior. In other words, we ask
whether there is a player who can obtain a more preferred outcome by sub-
mitting to the proposed algorithms a preference diﬀerent from his or her true
preference.
Let ϕ : G → CN be a rule that associates a coalition structure to each
hedonic game on player set N. Then, for each (N,P) ∈ G, ϕ(N,P) denotes
the coalition structure obtained by applying ϕ to (N,P).F o r e a c h i ∈ N,
we denote by ϕi(N,P) the coalition in ϕ(N,P) to which player i belongs.
For every P =( º1,º2,...,ºn),P0 =( º0
1,º0
2,...,º0
n) ∈ P,w ed e n o t eb y
δ(P,P0)={i ∈ N |ºi 6≡º0
i} the set of players whose preferences in P and
P0 are diﬀerent.
Deﬁnition 3 Let ¯ P ⊆ P. We say that ϕ : G → CN is strategy-proof
on ¯ P if ϕi(N,P) ºi ϕi(N,P0) for each i ∈ N and every P,P0 ∈ ¯ P with
δ(P,P0)={i},w h e r eºi is the preference of player i ∈ N in preference
17proﬁle P.
In what follows in this section we concentrate on the rule ϕ1 : G → CN
that associates a coalition structure to each (N,P) ∈ G according to Algo-
rithm 1, and on the rule ϕ2 : G → CN that associates a coalition structure
to each (N,P) ∈ G according to Algorithm 2. However, as mentioned in
Section 3, the outcome of Algorithm 1 may not be unique when the largest
clique in H(N,P) is not unique. In the following, a more precise description of
Algorithm 1 is given.
For each X ⊆ N,l e teX =( eX
1 ,e X
2 ,...,e X
n ) be the n-dimensional vector
with eX
i =1if i ∈ X,a n deX
i =0otherwise. Then, for all X,Y ⊆ N,w e
write X D Y if and only if (1) eX = eY or (2) there is k ∈ {1,...,n} such
that eX
i = eY
i for all i<kand eX
k <e Y
k .N o t i c e t h a t D is a lexicographic
o r d e ro v e ra l ls u b s e t so fN. We formulate now Algorithm 1*.
Algorithm 1*
• Set Y := N and C := ∅.
• Repeat the following until Y = ∅:
- Find all cliques X ⊆ Y in H(Y,P) with the largest number of vertices,
and collect them in the set X.
- Find the clique X ∈ X such that X D X0 for all X0 ∈ X.
-S e tY := Y \ X and C := C ∪ {X}.
• Return C.
Notice that, in Algorithm 1∗, the selection of cliques is guided by the
lexicographic order D.W ed e n o t eb yϕ1∗ the rule that associates a coalition
structure to each (N,P) ∈ Ge according to Algorithm 1*, and we consider
ϕ1∗ instead of ϕ1.
18Proposition 6 The rule ϕ1∗
is strategy-proof on Pe.
Proof. Let i ∈ N,a n dl e tP,P0 ∈ Pe with δ(P,P0)={i}.F o re a c hj ∈ N,
we denote by Gj and G0
j the set of friends of player j respectively in P and
P0.F r o mδ(P,P0)={i},w eh a v eGi 6= G0
i and Gj = G0
j for each j ∈ N \{i}.
We distinguish the following two cases:
(1) G0
i ⊂ Gi. Keeping in mind that ϕ1∗ selects cliques and players’ prefer-











¯, and therefore, ϕ1∗
i (N,P) ºi ϕ1∗
i (N,P0).
In other words, player i has no incentive to report a smaller set of friends
under aversion to enemies.
(2) G0
i ∩ Bi 6= ∅.S i n c e ϕ1∗
selects cliques and players’ preferences are
b a s e do na v e r s i o nt oe n e m i e s ,w eh a v eϕ1∗
i (N,P0) Âi ϕ1∗






¯ ¯. Notice that this can happen only if there is
at least one player k ∈ ϕ1∗
i (N,P0) with i ∈ Gk and k ∈ G0
i \ Gi.B u t t h i s
means that k ∈ N \Gi = Bi, and therefore, ϕ1∗
i (N,P) Âi ϕ1∗
i (N,P0).H e n c e ,
player i has no incentive to declare a player k as his friend if k ∈ Bi.
Therefore, player i has no incentive to misrepresent his preference, i.e.,
ϕ1∗ is a strategy-proof on Pe.
We turn now to the rule ϕ2 that associates a coalition structure to each
game (N,P) ∈ G according to Algorithm 2.
Proposition 7 The rule ϕ2 is strategy-proof on Pf.
Proof. Let i ∈ N,a n dl e tP,P0 ∈ Pf with δ(P,P0)={i}.F o re a c hj ∈ N,
we denote by Gj and G0
j the set of friends of player j respectively in P and
P0.F r o mδ(P,P0)={i},w eh a v eGi 6= G0
i and Gj = G0
j for each j ∈ N \{i}.
We ﬁrst show that (ϕ2
i(N,P0)∩Gi) ⊆ (ϕ2
i(N,P)∩Gi).L e tj ∈ (ϕ2
i(N,P0)∩
Gi).S i n c eϕ2
i(N,P0) is a strongly connected component in H(N,P0),t h e r ee x -
19ists a path from j to i. Without loss of generality we assume that i appears
exactly once on such a path (because a shorter path from j to i can be ob-
tained from a path from j to i on which i appears more than once). Then,
i appears only as the last vertex on such a path. It follows that such a path
is also in H(N,P), because Gj = G0
j for each j ∈ N \{ i}.F r o m j ∈ Gi,
there exists a path from i to j in H(N,P), because edge (i,j) is contained in
H(N,P).T h e r e f o r e ,j ∈ ϕ2
i(N,P), because ϕ2
i(N,P) is a strongly connected
component in H(N,P).
Suppose (ϕ2
i(N,P0) ∩ Gi) is a proper subset of (ϕ2
i(N,P) ∩ Gi).T h e n ,
we have ϕ2
i(N,P0) ≺i ϕ2
i(N,P), because player’s preferences are based on
appreciation of friends. Thus, player i has no incentive to misrepresent Gi
by G0
i, and we are done.
Now suppose (ϕ2
i(N,P0) ∩ Gi)=( ϕ2
i(N,P) ∩ Gi),a n dw es h o wt h a t
(ϕ2
i(N,P)∩Bi) ⊆ (ϕ2
i(N,P0)∩Bi).L e tj ∈ (ϕ2
i(N,P)∩Bi).S i n c eϕ2
i(N,P)
is a strongly connected component in H(N,P), there exists a path p from i to j
in H(N,P), and there also exists a path p0 from j to i in H(N,P). Again, without
loss of generality, we assume that i appears exactly once on each of p and p0.
It follows that all vertices which appear on p belong to ϕ2
i(N,P).L e tk be
the vertex appearing on path p immediately after i.O b s e r v e t h a t k ∈ Gi,
and thus, k ∈ (ϕ2
i(N,P)∩Gi). By assumption, we have k ∈ (ϕ2
i(N,P0)∩Gi),
and thus, there is a path from i to k in H(N,P0).
Let p00 be the subpath of p from k to j.O b s e r v et h a ti does not appear
on p00, and thus, p00 is also a path (from k to j)i nH(N,P0). Moreover, observe
that p0 is also a path (from j to i)i nH(N,P0),b e c a u s ei appears only as the
last vertex on p0.T h e r e f o r e ,w eh a v ej ∈ ϕ2
i(N,P0),b e c a u s eϕ2
i(N,P0) is a
strongly connected component in H(N,P0), and there are paths from i to k,
from k to j,a n df r o mj to i.
20Now we can conclude that ϕ2
i(N,P0) ¹i ϕ2
i(N,P). Therefore, each player
has no incentive to misrepresent his or her preference, i.e., ϕ2 is a strategy-
proof on Pf.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have shown in this paper that for a separable hedonic game two simple al-
gorithms play an important role: the ﬁrst algorithm (Algorithm 1) partitions
the set of players into coalitions each of which is a clique in the directed graph
corresponding to the game; the second algorithm (Algorithm 2) partitions the
set of players into coalitions each of which is a strongly connected compo-
nent of the directed graph corresponding to the game. The importance of
these algorithms is due to the following observations: (1) Algorithm 2 deliv-
ers a contractual individually stable coalition structure in polynomial time
when players’ preferences are separable; (2) Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2
generate core stable and individually stable coalition structures when play-
ers’ preferences are based on aversion to enemies and appreciation of friends,
respectively; (3) adding mutuality to aversion to enemies and to appreciation
of friends guarantees that the coalition structures generated by Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 are Nash stable on the corresponding preference domains as
well; (4) both algorithms (with a slight modiﬁcation of Algorithm 1) prevent
players from strategic behavior on the corresponding domains.
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